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Abstract 
Integration with the European Union has been an important driver of economic, political and 
social transformation in the Western Balkans. In recent years, however, the pace of structural 
reforms in the region has decelerated and the trend of economic catch-up seen in the 2000s 
has not resumed after the slowdown of the global economic crisis. This has coincided – at 
least temporally, if not causally – with a ‘temporary freeze’ in the EU’s enlargement towards the 
region. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to investigate the role of EU conditionality on 
economic reforms and convergence in the Western Balkans. To do so, it provides original, albeit 
descriptive, empirical evidence showing a strong link between EU-related structural reforms 
(towards the Copenhagen Criteria) and economic growth; and subsequently presents an 
analytical model demonstrating the mechanisms of policy decisions for reforms under EU 
conditionality. The model assumes away sectoral interests, policy uncertainty and coordination 
problems, allowing the analysis to focus specifically on the tension between two objectives: 
the pursuit of EU accession, through the implementation of jointly agreed reforms, and the 
accommodation of domestic policy concerns (maintaining policy stability and public support). 
Our results unveil a policy dilemma for the EU, having to choose between maximising the 
reform effort and minimising non-compliance. Drawing on this model, we discuss extensively 
the policy options that the EU faces in trying to enhance the reform performance, growth 
trajectories and, ultimately, European perspective of the countries in the region. 
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The Role of EU Integration in Accelerating 
Structural Reforms in the Western Balkans: 
Evidence, Theory and Policy 
 
1. Introduction 
For over six decades the European Union has contributed to the advancement of peace 
and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe. In this context, European 
enlargement has played a significant role in integrating and democratising the 
transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe. With some problems initially, this 
proved to be true also in the Western Balkans, where the EU contributed towards 
peace and stability after decades of conflicts, among others, mainly due to the promise 
for a better future with political stability and economic prosperity. 
However, recent developments in the European Union, with the Eurozone crisis and 
the rise of Euroscepticism, as well as in the Western Balkans, with the political 
challenges that emerged recently (Carpenter, 2017), raise questions about the pace and 
credibility of the EU integration process in the Western Balkans.1  A recent paper by 
                                                   
1 The crisis also unveiled other problems with EU conditionality, not least with regard to the 
democratic legitimacy of structural reforms imposed under fiscal consolidation programmes, 
which have tested the democratic institutions in some countries especially in the Eurozone 
south. Notwithstanding the importance of this issue, our focus in this paper is specifically with 
the problems of conditionality and adaptation in the Western Balkans, given the stated shared 
objective by the counties in the region for political approximation and economic integration 
with the EU, i.e., without questioning the premises underpinning the enlargement process.   
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the European Parliament’s Policy Department makes this clear: “Despite initial 
success, the current approach to enlargement has reached its limits, as it seems to be 
slowing down the integration process rather than accelerating it. In the meantime, in 
addition to the democratic and economic setbacks in the region, renewed tensions are 
threatening to undermine fragile regional stability. Moreover, the EU’s unfinished 
business in the Balkans opens the door to various political, economic and security 
alternatives […] The current autopilot mode of enlargement cannot continue.” (DGEP, 
2015). Indeed, according to international reform indicators, in recent years the pace of 
structural reforms in the Western Balkan countries has slowed down and catching-up 
after the global economic crisis is slower compared to the New Member States (IMF, 
2015a). 
Seen from the Western Balkans perspective, besides the delays, EU integration 
represents the best perspective – as stated also by DGEP (2015): “Even though the 
strength of the EU anchor has been diminished by both the internal problems of the 
European Union and the fact that full membership for Western Balkans countries is 
clearly a long way off, EU approximation is advancing and still represents the best 
hope for institutional reform.” Accordingly, we may say that EU enlargement towards 
the Western Balkans needs to be accelerated. Additional efforts need to be taken from 
both sides, the countries of the region and the European Union, to complete 
successfully the process of European integration and economic modernisation for the 
Western Balkans. 
At the same time, however, EU enlargement passes through the implementation of a 
large programme of structural reforms and institutional change in the region. This is 
widely acknowledged in policy documents, which regularly highlight the interplay 
between domestic structural reforms and the EU association process. For example, in 
its 2015 Enlargement Strategy the European Commission was arguing that 
“[e]nlargement needs to be understood as a process which supports reform and the 
fundamental changes needed to meet the obligations of EU membership. […] 
Enlargement can only be of benefit to the EU and to partner countries if there is genuine, 
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sustainable reform.” (COM, 2015, p.4; emphasis added). In the latest EU Enlargement 
Strategy (COM, 2018a, p.1), the European Commission put this more boldly: “It is 
important to recognise that accession negotiations are not – and never have been – an 
end in themselves. They are part of a wider process of modernisation and reforms” 
(emphasis in the original). 
This reform agenda in the Western Balkans is pursued via a number of channels. 
Formally, the region benefits from a coordinated policy framework to structural 
reforms, under the SEE2020 Strategy which, mirroring the Europe2020 goals, aims at 
achieving “smart, inclusive and sustainable” growth for each country in the region 
with good governance institutions and deeper economic integration (RCC, 2016). In 
the economic sphere reforms are also pursued under the free trade agreement of the 
region, CEFTA (Thomas and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2014). Other, more EU-centred 
processes, however, are much more central for the reform agenda in the region (Uvalic, 
2019) as they link more directly to EU pre-accession conditionality – including the 
Stabilisation and Association process and, more recently, the Berlin process with its 
promotion of a Regional Economic Area for the Western Balkans (Sanfey and 
Milatovic, 2019).  
Despite this policy activism, there is wide recognition that the intensity of reforms and 
policy commitment to these has subsided in the region. This is reflected in the almost-
agonizing call by the European Commission in its latest EU Enlargement Strategy 
document for “[t]he governments of the enlargement countries […] to embrace the 
necessary reforms more actively and truly make them part and parcel of their political 
agenda – not because the EU is asking for it, but because it is in the best interests of 
their citizens.” 
It is not difficult to argue that overcoming these problems requires a deeper 
understanding of how the EU integration process helps accelerate structural reforms 
and what the impediments to this may be. This paper aims to contribute in this 
direction, by providing fresh evidence about the role of EU integration for economic 
Structural Reforms in the Balkans 
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growth and institutional upgrading; and by developing a simple but informative 
model showing how the EU can act both as a ‘reform accelerator’ and as a source of 
reform delays in the presence of a slow accession process and domestic resistances to 
reform. Given the slowdown of structural reforms and of economic growth in the post-
crisis period, and the slowdown in the EU integration process of the Western Balkans, 
these contributions help us derive interesting policy conclusions for accelerating the 
reform process in the Western Balkans and, through this, facilitating higher economic 
growth and faster catch-up to the EU living standard. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review 
selectively the literature about the link between the EU integration process and 
progress with structural reforms. In section three we provide some empirical evidence 
on this link, drawing on the experience of the New Member States and contrasting this 
to that of the Western Balkans. In section four we develop a theoretical model which 
shows how the EU can act as an anchor for reforms but also how EU involvement leads 
to (perceived or real) reform delays under the presence of status quo bias by the public. 
In section five we follow through three interesting extensions of the model, which 
allow us to introduce different assumptions concerning preferences towards reforms 
by the government and the public. Section six discusses the policy implications 
emanating from the model, identifying a number of policy areas where the EU, as well 
as national governments, can place increased emphasis and take increased 
responsibility. The last section summarises and concludes. 
2. Structural reforms and reform delays 
Following the global financial crisis and the problems that emerged with the 
economies of the Eurozone, the issue of structural reforms has re-emerged in the 
international policy agenda. Within the European Union, structural reforms are today 
believed to be not only important for long-run growth but also essential for “the ability 
of economies to adjust to shocks” (Canton et al., 2014, p.1). A clear agenda and 
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procedures for structural reforms have been developed subsequently, in part through 
the European Semester (COM, 2017; Campos et al, 2018a).  
In the case of transition countries and countries belonging to the EU pre-accession 
process – such as those of the Western Balkans – calls for deeper and faster structural 
reforms have been perhaps more emphatic, owing in part to a realisation that the pace 
and commitment to reforms in these countries has subsided after the crisis (EBRD, 
2013; Kovtun et al, 2014; IMF, 2015a). For example, already in 2013 the EBRD 
Transition Report was claiming that “structural reforms continue to face serious 
obstacles” and that “the economic downturn has eroded popular support for reforms”. 
Similarly, in its 2015 Special Report on the Western Balkans the IMF also claimed that 
“the process of structural transformation began to stall in the mid-2000s, in the face of 
vested interests and as reform fatigue set in, and remains incomplete”, adding that 
“[e]mbarking anew on deep structural reform is a key policy priority for the region” 
(IMF, 2015a, p.9); while in its 2016 assessment of the Western Balkans, the European 
Commission has acknowledged that, across the region, “structural shortcomings 
persist, notably in the key areas of rule of law and the economy” (COM, 2016a, p.2). 
Last, in its recent Regular Economic Report on the Western Balkans, and despite seeing 
overall a positive outlook for reforms in the region, the World Bank also emphasised 
that it is “important to accelerate the pace of structural reforms to boost medium-term 
growth” (World Bank, 2017a, p.22).  
In the particular case of the Western Balkans, of course, the issue of reforms is 
particularly complex as it links to wider political, institutional and societal changes 
and well as to the very accession process (EU enlargement) and thus to the 
mechanisms of EU conditionality.2 Indeed, a large literature exists that discusses the 
problems of institutional transformation and political and economic reforms in the 
region exactly under the prism of pre-accession conditionality and the so-called ‘EU 
                                                   
2 As noted recently in an EBRD publication, “the long-term EU perspective is a major plus and 
a unique quality of the region compared with other emerging markets, as it helps to anchor 
market-oriented reforms and European standards” (Sanfey et al., 2016). 
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transformative power’ (Grabbe, 2006 and 2014; Gateva, 2015). Drawing from earlier 
contributions concerning the experience of the 2004 Enlargement (Hughes et al, 2004; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005) and building on earlier analyses about the 
problems of transition in the region (Kuzio, 2001; Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003), this 
literature attributes the origins of reform delays, or reform failures, in the region on 
two sets of factors. On the one hand, problems emanating from the side of the EU, 
including its ‘ambivalence’ (lack of clarity with regard to the rules of EU accession or 
of commitment to enlargement – Grabbe, 2014; Börzel and van Hüllen, 2014), its 
inattention to local institutional conditions and to buying-in local actors and elites 
(Noutcheva, 2009; Vachudova, 2014), and its reform targets which may be too strict or 
unrealistic (Uvalic, 2012; Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit, 2012). On the other hand, 
problems specific to the region, such as the unresolved ethnic and statehood issues 
(Borzel, 2016), vested national and sectoral interests (Vachudova, 2014) and the 
absence of a “robust local demand for change towards Europeanisation” (Noutcheva 
et al., 2013). 
These issues noted, the wider literature recognises that the EU is a significant stimulus 
for growth and convergence for associated countries. The substantial institutional 
transformation, fast economic restructuring and sustained income growth of the CEE 
countries provides ample evidence for this (for recent causality inferential evidence on 
this see, inter alia, Monastiriotis et al, 2017, and Campos et al., 2018b). In this regard, 
it is widely acknowledged that the EU has not only an autonomous effect on growth 
for the associated countries (e.g., through economic integration and membership) but 
also, if not most importantly, by incentivising structural reforms.  
This creates a puzzle: if the EU association process is growth-enhancing, both 
autonomously and via the facilitation of structural reforms, then why is it that we see 
significant reform delays and ‘fake’ compliance (as identified in the academic political 
science literature) or significant reform gaps and decelerating reforms (as identified in 
the economics and policy analyses)? If reforms are both growth-enhancing and a 
precondition for accession, shouldn’t national governments be pursuing (and 
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implementing) reforms more actively and faster? In the political economy literature 
problems of reform delays and non-compliance are generally associated with various 
types of political market failures, not only related to corruption and capture (Innes, 
2014) but also related to problems of institutional quality (see, inter alia, Acemoglu et 
al., 2005; Aghion et al., 2005; Ciccone and Papaioannou 2009), distributive politics (e.g., 
Alesina and Rodrik, 1994), or even pure information and coordination problems (e.g., 
time-inconsistency – Kydland and Prescott, 1977; or status-quo bias – Fernandez and 
Rodrik, 1991). As noted, the literature on EU conditionality in the Western Balkans 
emphasises instead problems of external policy design (misfit, inconsistency) and 
problems of domestic compliance (Dzankic et al, 2019). 
In this paper we provide a bridge between the two literatures, by developing an 
analytical model offering an exposition of the problem of delayed reforms and reform 
gaps in the Western Balkans under the stimulus of the EU. Our model incorporates 
features appealing to the EU conditionality literature, such as the role of the EU as an 
anchor to shift reform priorities, and ones more formally addressed in the wider 
political economy literature, such as reform resistance associated with status quo bias 
– as well as assumptions consistent with the evidence in the empirical literature of 
reforms, which shows structural reforms to have significant short-run costs despite 
their long-term welfare benefits (see, inter alia, Babecky and Havranek, 2014; IMF, 
2015b; Dabla-Norris et al., 2016). Before presenting this model, in the next section we 
provide some fresh evidence concerning the impact of EU association on growth and 
the pace of structural reforms in the Western Balkans.  
3. Empirical evidence 
In the last 25 years the evidence from both the Western Balkans and Central and 
Eastern Europe shows that there has been significant convergence with the EU average 
level of living standards both during the transition period of the 1990s and later 
through the EU integration process (IMF 2015a and World Bank, 2017b). However, in 
recent years convergence has slowed down, while after the economic crisis catching-
Structural Reforms in the Balkans 
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up is slower in the Western Balkans compared to the New Member States. To 
demonstrate this, we plot in Figure 1 the evolution of GDP per capita in the Western 
Balkan countries expressed as a share of the EU average (panel a) and then, 
comparatively, the average growth trajectories in the New Member States (NMS) and 
the Western Balkans (WB) since 2004 (panel b) and for two sub-periods (panels c-d). 
As can be seen, perhaps with the exception of Serbia, convergence to the EU average 
has plateaued across the Western Balkans. What is also important, growth trajectories 
in the Western Balkans compare unfavourably also in relation to those in the NMS. 
Over the period 2004-2008 the Western Balkans have followed a flatter growth trend 
than the NMS and this discrepancy has, if anything, intensified since 2009.  
Figure 1. GDP per capita Convergence & Catching-up 
 
(a) (b) 
   
(c) (d) 
    
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data: GDP per capita in PPS as a share of EU-28 
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As a result, despite past convergence, there is still a substantial gap in living standards 
between the EU and the economies of the Western Balkans – and a widening gap 
between the latter and the NMS. It is thus clear that the countries of the Western 
Balkans need to grow much faster in order to catch-up to the EU level in any 
reasonable timeframe. Further, analysing across the Copenhagen convergence criteria 
(Figure 2 – based on the European Commission’s Enlargement Progress Reports), the 
evidence shows that countries in the region have shown slower progress in fulfilment 
of the political criteria compared to the economic ones as well as to the one related to 
approximation with the European ‘Acquis’. This in some way indicates that meeting 
the political criteria may be more sensitive from a policymakers’ point of view. But, 
importantly for our analysis in this paper, it also shows that progress with political 
and economic reforms is generally lagging behind to progress with institutional 
approximation – suggesting a general under-shooting with regard to reforms despite 
a general commitment to the EU process.  
 
Figure 2. 
Copenhagen convergence criteria: Progress and Readiness 
Political Criteria Economic Criteria Acquis 
   
Readiness (vertical axis): 1 –early stage; 2 - satisfactory; 3 - moderate; 4 - good;5 – advanced 
Progress (horizontal axis): 1 – backsliding; 2 - stagnating; 3 - moderate; 4 - good; 5 – very good 
Source: Author’s illustrations based on European Commission data (COM, 2016a and 2016b) 
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Our next step is to investigate the relationship between structural reforms and 
economic convergence. Initially, we look at comparative statistics about the 
relationship of Copenhagen convergence criteria and GDP per capita of each country 
as a ratio to the EU-28 average (Figure 3). As can be seen, there is a positive relationship 
between economic development (measured as the extent of convergence to the EU-28 
GDP per capita) and each of the three criteria (political, economic and acquis). 
Interestingly, in this descriptive correlation analysis, the relationship appears 
strongest (i.e., a steeper slope for the fitted line) in the case of the political criteria, i.e., 
exactly the ones where the Western Balkans show the slowest progress and ‘readiness’.  
 
Figure 3. 
Copenhagen convergence criteria and GDP per capita as a share of EU-28 average 
 
Political Criteria 
 
Economic Criteria 
 
Acquis 
   
Readiness (horizontal axis): 1 –early stage; 2 - satisfactory; 3 - moderate; 4 - good;5 – advanced 
GDP per capita (PPS) as a share of EU-28 average (Vertical axis) 
Red line represents the simple linear regresion with dependent variable: GDP p.c.as % of EU-28 average 
Source: Author’s illustrations basen on European Commission data (COM, 2016a and 2016b) and data 
from Eurostat 
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EU membership, to account for the known effect that this has on convergence (Campos 
et al, 2018b), as well as lags of the dependent variable, to account for long-term 
dynamics.3  We examine this model for three composite indicators of institutional 
performance, namely the World Bank’s World Governance Index, the EBRD’s 
Transition index, and the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic 
Forum.4 Specifically, our estimating relationship takes the form: 
!"#,% = '( + '*,+,!"#,%-+ + './0#,% + '123#,% + 4#,%5+6*   
where, GC is GDP per capita as a share of the EU-15 average; SR stands for our 
alternative structural indicators; EU is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the 
countries and years of EU membership; e is a random error; L is the number of lags (l); 
and subscripts c and t index countries and years, respectively.  
Starting with the estimates on the distributed lags of the dependent variable (relative 
GDP per capita), as can be seen, it appears that there is a very stable long-run 
relationship between the local and EU-15 levels of GDP per capita. In all models, the 
sum of the lagged coefficients is statistically equal to 1, suggesting that net of our 
controls for EU membership and institutional quality relative long-run growth in our 
sample follows a random walk, i.e., does not produce convergence to the EU average. 
In other words, relative development levels are rather persistent and no autonomous 
process of convergence is found. In contrast, convergence is significantly influenced 
by EU membership, with the estimated coefficients on the EU membership indicator 
being highly significant statistically across models. Turning to the structural 
                                                   
3 Alternative estimations using fixed effects models and models estimated with GMM produce 
results in the same direction and are available upon request.  
4  In the Appendix we present results for the disaggregate components of each of these 
indicators (a total of 25 indicators). The results show high consistence across, with all measures 
having a positive association with economic performance and the vast majority of them being 
statistically significant at 1% (exceptions are the Infrastructure, Macroeconomic Environment 
and Higher Education sub-indexes of the GCI, which fail to be significant at 10%).   
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indicators, which are of course the main interest here, our results indicate again a 
positive and highly significant effect statistically. A one-unit increase in the World 
Governance Index is associated with a higher relative GDP per capita by 1.8 
percentage points. The relationship for the Transition index appears flatter (0.7 
percentage points) and for the Global Competitiveness Index it appears less strong 
statistically (significant at 5%), reflecting perhaps the fact that institutions related to 
the quality of governance are more relevant for economic development than the more 
narrowly-defined transition indicators and the more broadly defined indicators of 
competitiveness. It is important to note that these estimates become significantly 
weaker when not controlling for the persistence in relative GDP per capita, i.e., the 
inclusion of the distributed lags of the dependent variable. This shows that the benefits 
from EU membership and institutional reforms materialise in the long-run, while their 
effects in the short-run can be much weaker and sometimes negative.  
Table 1. The impact of structural indicators on convergence 
 
Dynamic	Panel	Data	Regression
Dependent	variable:	Country's	GDP	p.c.	as	a	share	of	average	EU-15
Variables/Reform World	governance	index Transition	index Global	competitiveness	index
L.gdp15 1.264*** 1.375*** 1.294***
(0.0552) (0.0366) (0.0355)
L2.gdp15 -0.337*** -0.399*** -0.545***
(0.0531) (0.0378) (0.0671)
L3.gdp15 0.213***
(0.0522)
L4.gdp15 0.00923
(0.0642)
Structural	reforms 1.845*** 0.701*** 1.129**
(0.4130) (0.2300) (0.4900)
EU	membership 0.565*** 0.337*** 0.878***
(0.1290) (0.1240) (0.2990)
Constant 2.611*** -1.166** -3.408**
(0.4040) (0.5870) (1.7290)
Years 1996-2016 1996-2014 2006-2017
Observations 208 260 126
Number	of	countries 16 16 16
ar1p 0.00131 0.00209 0.00096
ar2p 0.0425 0.0798 0.12
hansenp 0.485 0.888 0.257
sarganp 0 0 0.00000472
Note:	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	(Robust	standard	errors	in	paranthesis)
More	details	in	Appendix:	Tables	1A,	2A	and	3A.
Data:	World	governance	indicators	(World	Bank);	Transition	indicators	(EBRD);	Global	Competitiveness	Index	(WEF);	GDP	(IMF,	WEO)
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All in all, the evidence presented here points to a number of important conclusions: 
institutional quality and structural reforms have a significant bearing on economic 
development and convergence with the EU; at the same time, institutional quality – 
and especially political and, less so, economic reforms – are generally lagging behind 
in the Western Balkans; while the slowness in the region’s progress with reforms is, at 
least in prima facie terms, correlated with the slowdown of convergence with the EU 
since the crisis. In the next section we present a stylised model which seeks to explain 
why this may be, despite the expressed commitment to the European perspective of 
the Western Balkans, by both the EU and the countries in the region. 
4. A model of endogenous reform delays 
The main hypothesis of the EU enlargement process is that implementation of the 
convergence criteria and reforms enhance economic growth and catching-up with the 
EU living standard. As we have already discussed, however, in the Western Balkans 
implementation of reforms under the EU enlargement process is below parity, with 
significant delays and non-compliance even to agreed reforms.  
The intention of the theoretical analysis in this section is to offer an analytical 
perspective of what lies behind these reform failures and help identify the areas where 
the EU can play a role in enhancing the credibility of structural reforms and 
accelerating the accession process in the Western Balkans. Our analysis departs from 
the usual emphasis on vested sectoral interests and elite capture (Noutcheva, 2009; 
Vachudova, 2014) and instead focuses on problems of commitment to reforms that 
arise endogenously, due to uncertainty about the rewards associated with these 
reforms (e.g., EU accession) and the short-term costs of reforms which push the public 
towards favouring stability with regard to reforms (status quo bias). In the model, both 
the public and the government value EU accession. Still, under specific conditions, in 
part relating to the intensity or pervasiveness of reforms requested by the EU, in 
maximising its welfare the government delivers a lower level of reforms than what it 
voluntarily agrees with the EU. Our model also abstracts from other potential factors 
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influencing policy developments in the Western Balkans – and the commitment of the 
region in particular to the European perspective. Although we acknowledge in this 
regard the influence that the recent policy activism in the region, by countries such as 
Russia, China and the Gulf states, may have on domestic policy decisions and policy 
preferences – and on compliance with EU conditionality in particular – we choose to 
abstract from these influences so as to maintain the tractability of our model and its 
focus on the issues that are of direct interest here, namely the problems of compliance 
that are endogenous to the conditionality process itself. 
4.1. Model setting 
The government. To ensure general applicability, we assume that the government is 
reform-neutral, i.e., it does not have a preference for or against reforms.5 In line with 
our preceding discussion however, the government has a preference to pursue 
accession to the EU. To this purpose, it negotiates with the EU on the level of reforms 
required (rEU). Meeting this target raises the utility of the government and, as we shall 
see later, it also raises the support the government receives from the public (who are 
also assumed to be in favour of accession). Irrespective of the EU and the level of 
reforms, the government enjoys an exogenously given level of public support (sN). 
Negative deviations from this ‘natural’ level of support reduce the welfare of the 
government, while positive deviations give extra utility to the government. 
Under this setting, we can write the objective function of the government as a simple 
loss function of the form: 
7 = −9*(;<= − ;). − 9.(?@ − ?)    (1) 
where α1 and α2 represent the weights that the government assigns to pursuing 
accession and to enjoying public support, respectively; and the second term is linear 
to reflect the assumption that the government gains welfare by receiving ‘excess’ 
                                                   
5 See later for an extension that relaxes this assumption. 
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support above its ‘natural’ level.6 It is evident from eq.1 that the government’s welfare 
is maximised when r=rEU and s=sN (or, s=smax>sN, if this is possible). However, this 
optimal equilibrium is not unconditional, as it depends on the public’s attitudes 
towards the EU and towards reforms.  
The public. We assume that the public is also in favour of accession and thus gains 
utility when the government meets its negotiated reform target with the EU, which is 
a pre-condition for accession. We further assume, however, that the public has a status 
quo bias, i.e., it derives negative utility from reforms that exceed a specific threshold, 
in either direction (reform under-shooting as well as over-shooting).7 Given our model 
choice not to consider heterogeneous groups in society (no vested interests), this 
assumption is crucial: assuming away any disutility from reforms under this setting 
would render the government’s policy problem (how much to reform) trivial – with 
the maximum obtained at r=rmax (infinite reforms). As noted earlier, we also assume 
that there is a ‘natural’ level of support that the public has for the government. Under 
these conditions, we can express the public’s objective function (welfare) in terms of 
the support it lends to the government: 
                                                   
6  In contrast, the first term is quadratic because missing the EU target is costly to the 
government from any side. This is consistent with our assumption that the government is 
reform-neutral, but it is also empirically intuitive. In the case of an under-reforming 
equilibrium (r<rEU), this is obvious to see: the EU would respond to under-reforms by lowering 
its rewards (delaying accession). In the case of over-reforms, this can be rationalised on the 
basis of signals: ‘excess’ reforms by the government will likely be interpreted as a capacity 
signal by the EU, which may end up raising its reform target for the government in the future. 
Given that reforms are costly (in relation to public preferences, as we shall see below), and also 
given that the accession process, by its own structure and nature, cannot be significantly 
accelerated unless wider geo-political conditions are in place, this is a pure cost to the 
government. In any case, as noted earlier, this assumption is relaxed in an extension of the 
model (section 5). 
7 In this simple version of the model we consider the extent of status quo bias as exogenously 
fixed. In section 5 we consider the implications of an extension of the model where the extent 
of reform bias is determined endogenously. In the same section we also consider the 
implications of relaxing the status quo bias assumption and simply allowing the public to have 
a preference against reforms. 
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? = ?@ − A*B;CD − ;E. − A.(;<= − ;).    (2) 
where β1 and β2 represent, respectively, how much the public dislike deviations from 
the status quo (disutility from reforms) and how much it values accession (disutility 
from the government missing its EU target). It is clear in this representation (eq.2) that, 
in the absence of the EU (or of the prospect of accession), the public would maximise 
its welfare – and, by implication, its support to the government – at the point where 
reforms remain at the status quo level (r=rSQ).8  
The EU. To keep things simple, we assume that the EU sets exogenously the level of 
desired reforms and rewards complying governments (or penalises non-complying 
governments) to a value directly proportional to the reform achievement. This implies 
that any deviation from the EU target represents a direct cost to the government. 
Although we do not model the objective function of the EU (we treat rEU as exogenous), 
our implicit assumption here is that the utility of the EU is constant, i.e., it draws 
exactly the same amount of disutility from non-complying governments and from the 
pecuniary loss it experiences by handing out rewards to complying governments. In 
other words, in this setting the EU is indifferent between any alternative level of 
reforms implemented by the government. This is of course a simplifying assumption, 
but it is one which does not affect the direction or quality of our results.  
4.2. Equilibrium 
Full commitment. For exposition, let us first consider – before looking at the 
equilibrium obtained from the interaction between the EU, the government and the 
public – the welfare equilibrium if the government was to fully commit to the level of 
                                                   
8 Formally, status quo bias can be modelled as a public preference for reforms to stay within a 
range (say, {rSQ-c, rSQ+c}) of the existing level (or pace) of reforms (rSQ) – with the size of c 
showing the public’s tolerance threshold for deviations from the status quo (Alesina and 
Passarelli, 2017). Eq.2 is a simplified version of this, essentially imposing c=0. As noted, we 
discuss in section 5 how relaxing this assumption affects our results. 
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reforms agreed with the EU. In this case, the government would set r=rEU so that, from 
(2), 
? = ?@ − A*B;CD − ;<=E.          (3) 
and, by inserting (3) into (1), 
7 = −9.A*B;CD − ;<=E.     (4) 
As it can easily be inferred, in this case public support is below its ‘natural’ level (s<sN) 
and government welfare is negative (W<0) for any level of reforms agreed with the EU 
above (or below) the existing status quo (rEU>rSQ). Compared to the case where there is 
no interaction between the government and the EU and thus also no accession process 
(essentially imposing α1=β2=0), this is clearly a sub-optimal outcome. As was noted 
previously, in this latter case the government could simply set r=rSQ (no reforms) so 
that it receives its natural level of support (s=sN) and enjoys welfare equal to W=0 (zero 
welfare loss). This means that, under our model setting, for any case where EU 
accession negotiations take place (i.e., for every rEU>rSQ), no government will have the 
incentive to fully comply with the targets agreed with the EU. In other words, 
defection, or lack of commitment, is an equilibrium outcome determined 
endogenously by the model parameters. We can see this more clearly by solving the 
maximisation problem of the government.  
Optimal solution. To find its optimal level of reforms, following the demands of the 
EU (i.e., given rEU), the government will have to maximise (1) subject to (2). To find this 
optimal equilibrium, we first replace (2) into (1), so that 
7 = −9*(;<= − ;). − 9. F?@ − ?@ + A*B;CD − ;E. + A.(;<= − ;).G (5) 
and then differentiate the resulting expression (eq.5) with respect to the policy variable 
(r), setting it equal to zero and solving for r: 
HIHJ = 0 => ⋯	=> 	; = ;CD OPQROPQRS(TRSOPQP) + ;<= TRSOPQPOPQRS(TRSOPQP)   
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and, by further manipulation, 
; = U;CD + (1 − U);<=     (6) 
which is a weighted average between the status quo and the EU-driven reform target, 
with U = OPQROPQRS(TRSOPQP) . Given that all parameters in this last expression are positive 
(α1, α2, β1, β2>0), it follows that U>0 and thus that r<rEU for any rEU>rSQ. Thus the optimal 
policy choice for the government is to ‘defect’, i.e., to deliver a level of reforms that is 
below the level agreed with the EU.  
As is easy to show, in this equilibrium the level of reforms will increase with α1 and β2 
(i.e., with the weight assigned to the accession process by the government and the 
public, respectively); and decline with α2 and β1 (i.e., respectively, the weight the 
government assigns to public support and the intensity by which the public dislikes 
reforms that deviate from the status quo). Perhaps more importantly, the extent of 
‘defection’ by the government will be proportionately greater, the more ‘aggressive’ 
the EU is in setting the reform target with the government, in other words the 
government will appear to lack credible commitment proportionately more, the higher 
the distance between the status quo and the EU target.  
Overall, our model provides a very interesting insight into the question of non-
compliance to the EU. Under the specific setting (status quo bias in the public and a 
reform-neutral government), non-compliance arises endogenously from the model, as 
the government has to balance between domestic demands and external 
commitments. We examine the policy options that this implies for the EU later, after 
first considering some possible extensions to this stylised model. 
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5. Extensions 
5.1. Direct disutility from reforms  
Status quo bias is a special case of public attitudes to reform. A more common 
assumption in the literature is that reforms carry negative utility, at least in the short-
run, so that the public derives negative utility from reforms irrespective of the existing 
status quo. In this case, eq.2 becomes  
? = ?@ − A*; − A.(;<= − ;).    (2’) 
with β1 now showing directly the intensity by which the public dislike reforms. In this 
representation, the public faces a trade-off between accepting reforms in exchange of 
ensuring some progress with the EU process and sacrificing the latter in exchange of 
not incurring costs associated to reforms. Evidently, in the absence of the EU (or of the 
prospect of accession), the public would maximise its welfare – and, by implication, 
its support to the government – at the point where reforms are minimised (r=0, if 
reforms are left-censored; or r=rmin<0, if ‘anti-reforms’ are possible). Although, taken 
literally, this is a rather unrealistic assumption (namely, that without the EU no 
country reforms!), it allows us to derive an important implication concerning the 
government’s reform commitment in the general case.9  
Specifically, in this case the objective function of the government becomes  
7 = −9*(;<= − ;). − 9.(?@ − ?@ + A*; + A.(;<= − ;).)   (5’) 
and the equilibrium solution to the maximisation problem is  
                                                   
9 If we were to assume, more realistically, that the public may have a preference for some 
reforms, but still without status quo bias, this could be introduced in the model by replacing 
the variable r with a variable measuring the distance between the government’s level of reforms 
(;) and the public’s desired level of reforms (;̿). In that case, eq.2’ becomes ? = ?∗ − A*(; − ;̿) −A.(;<= − ;). without any influence on our analysis (so long as ;̿ < ;<= , i.e. as long as the EU is 
still relevant for the setting of the reform target).  
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; = ;<= − OPQR.(TRSOPQP)     (6’) 
Given that, again, all parameters in eq.6’ are positive (α1, α2, β1, β2>0)10, it follows that, 
as before, r<rEU and thus the optimal policy choice for the government is to ‘defect’. In 
this case, however, the extent of the government’s under-shooting in relation to the 
EU target is fixed by the model parameters and thus more ambitious EU targets lead 
to proportionally lower amounts of defection (in practical terms, smaller reform 
delays). To see this, simply note that, whereas in eq.6’ HJHJZ[ = 1, in eq.6 HJHJZ[ = 1 − U <1 , meaning that in the present case, any increase in the EU target achieves 
proportionately more reforms than in the case of status quo bias.11  
5.2. Endogenous status quo bias  
As noted earlier, our treatment of status quo bias has been rather stylistic, assuming 
the status quo to be one single point of reform effort. As was noted in footnote 7, a 
more general representation of status quo bias allows the status quo to be defined 
within a range of reforms inside a neighbourhood (say, {rSQ-c, rSQ+c}). Introducing this 
possibility into our model produces some additional interesting insights. In this case, 
the public’s support function would take the form 
? = ?@ − A*(\). − A.(;<= − ;).    (2’’) 
                                                   
10 Note here that if β1<0, i.e., if the public values reforms positively, then the opposite conclusion 
holds and reforms will be in fact greater than those agreed with the EU, i.e., the government 
will ‘over-shoot’. In this case, of course, no EU target is needed and the policy problem becomes 
trivial.   11 It should be clarified that this concerns the proportional ‘defection’ relative to an increase in 
the EU reforms target. Whether the actual level of reforms will be higher or lower in the case 
where the public obtains direct disutility from reforms depends on the actual values of the 
model parameters, including the level of reforms targeted by the EU and those dictated by the 
status quo (rSQ). In particular, it can be shown that reforms will be higher with status quo bias 
if ;<= > ;CD + TPQRS(TRSTPQP).(TRSTPQP) .  
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with κ=(rSQ-c)-r if r < rSQ-c, κ=(rSQ+c)-r if r > rSQ+c, and κ=0 if rSQ-c ≤ r ≤ rSQ+c; and the size 
of c showing the public’s tolerance threshold for deviations from the status quo 
(Alesina and Passarelli, 2017). 
Focusing on the two cases of interest, namely when the EU-supported level of reforms 
is within the public’s tolerance range (κ=0) and when the EU-sponsored level of 
reforms exceeds the latter (κ=(rSQ+c)-r), produces the following results for the 
equilibrium level of reforms.  
(a) κ=0 à 7 = −('* + '.A.)(;<= − ;).  so that HIHJ = 0 => ⋯	=> 	; = ;<=  
The government commits fully to the EU target so long as the latter falls within 
the tolerance range of the public’s support for reforms (status quo). For EU 
targets within this range there is no reform gap. 
(b) κ=(rSQ+c)-r à 7 = −('* + '.A.)(;<= − ;). − '.A*B;CD + ] − ;E.  so that HIHJ =0 => ⋯	=> 	; = U(;CD + ]) + (1 − U);<=  and U is as defined previously. This 
case is completely analogous to what was shown in section 4: for reform targets 
above the public’s tolerance threshold, the government shows a commitment 
deficit which is proportional to U.  
It is of course important to ask what determines the size of c and thus the likelihood 
that the EU reform target will be within, or outside, the public’s tolerance threshold. 
In reality, the size of c will depend on a large range of factors, including historical, 
political, cultural, as well as economic. In our discussion here we want to highlight 
two specific factors that may be of direct relevance to policy: the past level of reforms 
and the progress with EU accession. As is well discussed in the literature, prolonged 
and pervasive reforms can often lead to what is known as ‘reform fatigue’, setting 
public preferences towards maintaining the policy status quo. Similarly, delays in 
progress with EU accession and concerns about the EU’s commitment to enlargement 
can lead to ‘reform disillusionment’, again setting public preferences towards 
maintaining the policy status quo. Both of these factors reduce the size of c (the public’s 
tolerance threshold for reforms), thus increasing the probability that κ>0 and thus also 
that r<rEU.  
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This observation seems to offer a very interesting explanation for the ‘puzzle’ of reform 
slowdowns that have been witnessed in the Western Balkans since the crisis (see our 
discussion in section 2). The prolonged and pervasive reforms that predated, but 
intensified with, the crisis and the EU’s decision, in part due to the crisis, to impose an 
official ‘freeze’ in future enlargements until at least 202012, may go a long way in 
explaining the slowdown of reforms in the region. In terms of our model, both factors 
will have a negative impact on the parameter c, thus increasing the probability that the 
government will ‘defect’ from its reform target. This is fully in line with the sense of 
‘token compliance’ identified in the literature with regard to reforms in the Western 
Balkans (Noutcheva et al., 2013; Vachudova, 2014). 
5.3. Pro-reforms governments  
Another interesting question with regard to the policy implications of our model 
concerns our assumption of reform-neutrality for the government. To examine what 
happens when this assumption is relaxed, we allow the government to gain additional 
utility by over-shooting on its agreed reform target (rEU<r), so that: 
7 = −9*(;<= − ;) − 9.(?@ − ?)    (1’) 
Using, for simplicity, the version of the public support function developed in section 
5.1 (no status quo bias – eq.2’), we obtain: 
7 = −9*(;<= − ;) − 9.(?@ − ?@ + A*; + A.(;<= − ;).)  (5’’) 
and, by differentiating with respect to r and setting equal to zero,   
HIHJ = 0 => ⋯	=> 	; = ;<= + OR-OPQR.OPQP    (6’’) 
                                                   
12 The European Commission has more recently expressed its intention to open the next wave 
of enlargement (for Montenegro and Serbia) to 2025. To a large extent, this maintains the 
‘freeze’ in the short- to medium-run.  
Fatmir Besimi & Vassilis Monastiriotis 
 23 
Based on eq.6’’, and continuing to assume that α1>0 and β2>0 (i.e., that both the 
government and the public value EU accession), there is no certainty in the under-
shooting equilibrium. Instead, this will depend fully on the relative values of the 
model parameters. The government will show full compliance with the EU if and only 
if 9* = 9.A* => A* = OROP, i.e., if the public’s aversion to reforms is equal to the relative 
weight the government gives to EU accession vis-à-vis public support. By implication, 
as governments become more ‘populist’ (defined as caring more for domestic support 
than for accession, so that α2 increases relative to α1), their reform effort subsides; while 
more ‘Europeanist’ governments will be more likely to meet and perhaps over-shoot 
the EU target, for any level of public support to reforms. 
6. Policy options for the EU 
Our standard model, as developed in section 4, identified four key parameters 
affecting the extent of domestic compliance to EU-sponsored reforms. On the basis of 
these, the policy options afforded to the EU in its attempt to stimulate reforms are as 
follows: 
a. Increase the weight that the government assigns to the accession process (α1), e.g., 
through the mechanisms of socialisation and lesson-drawing (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier, 2005). It should be noted, however, that in our model this will 
not achieve full compliance; it will simply reduce the discrepancy between r 
and rEU.   
b. Reduce the weight that the government assigns to public support (α2). As above, this 
will only reduce, rather than eliminate, the discrepancy between r and rEU 
(unless, that is, the EU successfully manages to bring α2 to zero). Note, 
however, that in practical terms, making the government more unresponsive 
to public demands may not be politically optimal (or even desirable), as it will 
evidently be (perceived as) undemocratic, heightening existing concerns about 
the legitimacy of EU conditionality.  
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c. Reduce the weight that the public assigns to reforms (ß1), i.e., the public’s aversion 
to reforms and/or status quo bias. Again this can perhaps be achieved through 
the mechanisms of socialisation and information-sharing, although this is 
undoubtedly a long-term process and not directly at the hands of policy-
makers. Nevertheless, this parameter is crucial: as we mentioned earlier, at the 
extreme the policy problem can become trivial if the EU succeeds in making 
the public obtain pro-reform preferences (β1<0).  
d. Increase the weight that the public assigns to the accession process (ß2), presumably 
by communicating more effectively the benefits from accession (including non-
pecuniary ones). Note here that under the assumptions of our model the EU 
cannot influence the public’s attitudes to accession by raising the material 
benefits of accession, as this would incur a direct cost to the EU.13  
We can get a sense of the relative importance of these parameters by examining how 
the reform gap changes for a unit change in each of these, i.e., by calculating rEU-r from 
eq.6 and comparing the values of the derivatives of this expression with respect to each 
of these parameters. These are as follows: 
^(;<= − ;)^'* = − '.A*('* + '.A* + '.A.). (;<= − ;CD) ^(;<= − ;)^A* = '.('* + '.A.)('* + '.A* + '.A.). (;<= − ;CD) ^(;<= − ;)^'. = A*('* + '.A.)('* + '.A* + '.A.). (;<= − ;CD) ^(;<= − ;)^A. = − '..A*('* + '.A* + '.A.). (;<= − ;CD) 
                                                   
13  This applies equally to the alternative option of the EU offering a side-payment to the 
government, to make it indifferent between defection and full compliance. From (4), this side-
payment would have to be to an amount equal to 9.A*B;CD − ;<=E. . Note that in this case the 
EU would have a private incentive to ask for a lower level of reforms (as the size of the side-
payment is proportional to the level of reforms requested).  
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From these, some further conclusions can be drawn: 
- Status quo bias versus government preferences for EU accession. Compared 
to reducing the public’s status quo bias (β1), raising the emphasis governments 
place to the accession process (α1) reduces the reform gap by more if and only 
if β1>α1+α2β2. In other words, when status quo bias is very high, it pays for 
emphasis to be placed on altering the preferences of the government (raising 
α1) – and inversely when status quo bias is low and the government emphasis 
on accession is high. 
- Government preferences for public support versus public preferences for EU 
accession. Similarly, when α2>β2+(α1/α2) the reduction in the reform gap for 
every unit rise in the public’s pro-EU sentiment will be greater than that 
achieved by a unit reduction in the government’s sensitivity to public support. 
It follows that in cases where governments are too ‘populist’ (high α2 and low 
α1), attention to changing public attitudes towards the EU appears most 
appropriate.  
- Public attitudes to EU accession and status quo. Reducing status quo bias will 
be more effective in terms of lowering the reform gap, relative to the alternative 
of pursuing this via raising the public’s support for EU accession, if and only if 
β1<β2+(α1/α2). Essentially this implies that, concerning public attitudes, policy 
should focus on the least intense of these: when the public feels more strongly 
about the status quo, policy should try to influence (favourably) the public’s 
attitudes towards the EU; when the public has strong preferences in favour of 
EU accession, policy should focus on reducing the public’s status quo bias.  
- Government attitudes to EU accession and public support. The condition for _`(abc-a)`dR _ > _`(abc-a)`dP _  is β1>1-(α1/α2). This means that when the public’s 
emphasis on EU accession is low, reform gaps can be reduced more effectively 
by raising the government’s emphasis on EU accession than by focusing on 
reducing the government’s attention to public support. Note, however, that 
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this condition is only met for very special values of α1 and α2 (such that α1<α2(1-
β2)) and thus it would appear that in most empirical cases the reform gap can 
be more effectively reduced if policy effort is placed on reducing the attention 
governments pay to public support than by raising their preferences towards 
EU accession. As noted earlier, this is inherently problematic, as it can raise 
concerns about the democratic legitimacy of the process. 
It is important to note that in all cases the extent of under-delivery of reforms (‘reform 
gap’) depends on the distance between the level of reforms targeted by the EU and the 
existing status quo. An important implication follows. In line with claims in the 
literature, that the effectiveness (‘transformative power’) of EU conditionality is 
hindered by the EU setting too high or too unrealistic targets (asking for too much too 
soon – Uvalic, 2012; Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit, 2012), in our model the EU can 
reduce the extent of non-compliance by domestic governments by lowering its reform 
target. Although this will produce, on the whole, a lower level of reforms, it will at the 
same time reduce the extent of non-compliance. In this sense, the EU faces a trade-off 
between maximising the reform effort and maximising compliance. While the former 
has clear economic benefits (at least in the long-run) and can help speed up accession, 
the latter may have reputational and wider political benefits (e.g., with regard to public 
perceptions about the legitimacy and effectiveness of EU conditionality).  
The extensions of our model provide additional policy options for the EU. As was 
shown in section 5.1, status quo bias produces, proportionately, a greater degree of 
non-compliance compared to the more general case where the public derives direct 
disutility from reforms (eq.2’). By implication, the EU can face a dividend from 
removing status quo bias (e.g., by encouraging a more open dialogue about the costs 
of reforms), even if this results in public attitudes that are directly against (any) 
reforms. This seemingly paradoxical result makes sense in a second-best world.14 
                                                   
14 It is also consistent with behavioural traits discussed in the behavioural economics literature 
(see, vis. Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). 
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Given that the EU faces domestic publics who are generally not in support of reforms 
(a possible first-best), the EU can gain by making the extent of defection independent 
to its reform target. In contrast to the conclusion drawn immediately above, this would 
allow the EU to set more ambitious reform targets without losing in terms of 
compliance.  
If the EU is unable to remove status quo bias in public attitudes to reform, there is still 
room for the EU to influence the extent of compliance, by raising the public’s reform 
tolerance threshold, as shown in our analysis of section 5.2. As was argued there, 
tolerance to reforms that deviate from the status quo increases with the credibility of 
the accession process as well as with the pacing of reforms. In this respect, policies 
aiming at bringing the prospect of accession closer (‘status before standards’ – Uvalic, 
2012; ‘unbundling’ – Trauner, 2009), setting clear ‘milestones’ (Vachudova, 2014) and 
careful targeting only the most necessary reforms (Börzel, 2016) can pay significant 
dividends, potentially eliminating non-compliance (in the terminology of our model, 
bringing κ to zero).  
A last policy option emerges from our analysis in section 5.3. It is intuitive to argue 
that pro-reforms governments will tend to produce more reforms for any level of 
public resistance to reforms or status quo bias. As we showed in section 5.3, however, 
even pro-reforms governments may be non-compliant, defecting from the EU target. 
In this case, too, much depends on the values of the key model parameters, namely α1, 
α2, β1 and β2, in line with our discussion in the beginning of this section. It follows that 
a strategy aiming at decoupling the pro-reform attitudes of the government from the 
EU accession process (in the semiology of our model, aiming at linearising the first 
term in the government welfare function as in eq.5''), as is for example suggested in 
the latest EU Enlargement Strategy document15, may in fact be of limited value: it may 
help with the pace of reforms but will not eliminate non-compliance for governments 
                                                   
15 See the quote, already cited in the Introduction, calling for governments in the region “to 
embrace the necessary reforms more actively […] not because the EU is asking for it, but 
because it is in the best interests of their citizens.” 
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which do not have strong commitment to the European perspective (‘Europeanist’) 
and instead have a high regard for maximising the support they receive from the 
public (‘populist’). In this regard, maintaining the link between the reforms agenda 
and the European perspective of the region, and indeed bringing the latter forward, 
remains a significant tool for incentivising reforms in the region, despite the valid 
claims that reforms are better delivered when there is local ‘ownership’ (Noutcheva et 
al., 2013). 
7. Conclusions 
The main hypothesis of the EU enlargement process is that implementation of the 
convergence criteria and reforms speed up EU integration for associated countries. 
This should increase the support by citizens and economic agents for reforms and 
enhance economic growth and catching-up with the EU living standard. However, in 
recent years the evidence shows a delay in structural reforms and slowdown of EU 
integration in the Western Balkans.  
The international academic and policy literature provides compelling evidence 
suggesting a positive impact of structural reforms on growth and convergence – 
however, this impact tends to vary with a country’s institutional quality and level of 
economic development. More importantly, recent evidence suggests that reforms 
incorporate short-term costs, not only in a distributional sense (‘winners and losers’) 
but also globally – with the positive impacts materialising over longer time-horizons. 
The results from our own empirical investigation in this paper suggest a positive 
correlation between structural reforms and economic convergence for the Western 
Balkan countries when long-run growth trajectories are controlled for. They also show 
that EU membership has a positive effect on economic performance, possibly 
indicating the role that the EU can have in increasing the credibility of, and 
commitment to, structural reforms. At the same time, our evidence showed that 
economic and especially political reforms lag behind in the Western Balkans. A 
number of explanations have been put forward in the literature for this: from ones 
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concentrating on the design of EU conditionality to ones raising issues of local 
ownership and the domestic ‘demand for reforms’. Still, the fact that reforms are 
under-delivered in the region, despite the wide evidence for their long-term benefits 
and despite the significant impetus (and guidance) offered by the EU process, remains 
a puzzle.  
To shed some light on this puzzle, we developed a political economy model, with 
reform-neutral governments, public preferences towards maintaining the status quo 
with regard to reforms, and both public and government support for the EU 
association process – examining also alternative assumptions (pro-reforms 
governments, anti-reforms public), for completeness. The main message from our 
model is that non-compliance (‘reform delays’) is intrinsic to the process that drives 
the reform effort, namely the process of EU conditionality. In our model, non-
compliance is not the result of information or coordination problems (e.g., time-
inconsistency, Kydland and Prescott, 1977) or of sectoral interests and distributive 
politics (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Vachudova, 2014). Instead, non-compliance arises 
endogenously, even for governments and publics who value positively the EU process 
(conditionality, accession): for as long as the EU targets reforms above the status quo 
favoured by the public domestically (or, more generally, above the public’s desired 
level of reforms), even with fully-informed publics and fully-committed governments 
the end result will – except in very specific and rather unlikely circumstances – be a 
level of reforms below that agreed with the EU.  
This is not to say, of course that governments bear no responsibility for reform delays 
and the reform gaps observed in the region. Indeed, in our model non-compliance 
depends not only on public preferences (for reforms, for accession, for the status quo) 
but crucially also on those of the government. Thus, even without attempting to alter 
the preference structure of the public,16 national governments can influence reform 
                                                   
16 Although our stylised model does not allow us to explore the full breadth of actions the 
government can pursue in this regard, actions such as communicating better the long-term 
benefits of reforms, taking ownership of the reform agenda in contexts of low public support 
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outcomes by changing their own structure of preferences (attitudes to reforms, EU 
accession and public support). Crucially, in this regard, non-compliance is 
independent of the overall (‘natural’) popularity of the government and thus the latter 
cannot be used as an excuse – e.g., in times of wider public disillusionment with central 
politics – for not implementing welfare-enhancing reforms. It is in this spirit, 
consistent with the findings of our model, that the European Commission emphasises 
that for enhancing the EU’s engagement with the Western Balkans “[i]t is now up to 
the countries' authorities, with the support of their societies, to take ownership and 
deliver on the well-known conditions for accession” (COM, 2018b, p.3).  
Besides the responsibility of governments, however, and perhaps more importantly, 
our model helps unveil a strategic policy dilemma for the EU. As was discussed in 
section 5.4, the EU seems to face a trade-off between the level of reforms implemented 
and the extent of reform compliance. Setting too high a reform target increases the 
level of reforms but also increases the extent of non-compliance. Setting reforms at too 
moderate a level will increase compliance but will not maximise the level of reforms. 
If, as our model predicts, this is a fact of life, then the optimal policy option for the EU is 
not to try to minimise non-compliance per se but rather to try to ensure a maximum level of 
reforms given non-compliance. In its policy menu, the EU may choose to pace reforms 
and bring forward the rewards of association for the candidate countries (to increase 
the reform tolerance threshold of the public); place more emphasis on strengthening 
pro-reform attitudes in the domestic populations (than in the ruling governments), 
especially where support for EU accession is high; encourage public dialogue about 
the costs and benefits of reforms so as to reduce the uncertainty that feeds into status 
quo bias (even if this results in strengthening anti-reform attitudes); and pursue reform 
targets which are not too testing for the countries implementing them. Above all, EU 
policy must openly accept that – depending on each country’s behavioural parameters 
– reform delays and non-compliance are a natural outcome of the process and not 
                                                   
for the accession process, and paying attention to the distributional consequences of reforms, 
can unquestionably help with making reforms more popular. 
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always, or exclusively, the result of poor/malicious implementation or of sectoral 
reform resistances. 
Either way, the economic position of the countries in the Western Balkans and the political 
and security importance that the EU association process has for the region, make the process of 
EU-driven reforms an absolute necessity. Political and economic reforms can help the 
countries in the region re-gain the economic dynamism they seemed to have just 
before the crisis and to support industrial diversification and upgrading, with more 
investment, greater levels of employment and higher productivity. While EU 
accession is unquestionably an important anchor for this, we hope that our analysis in 
this paper has contributed to understanding better the limitations to this process and 
the ways to overcome them.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. 
World governance indicators and convergence 
 
 
  
Dynamic	Panel	Data	Regression
Dependent	variable:	Country's	GDP	p.c.	as	a	share	of	average	EU-15
Variables/Reform
Voice	and	
accountability
Political	stability
Regulatory	
quality
Governance	
effectiveness
Rule	of	law
Control	of	
corruption
World	
Governance	
Index
L.gdp15 1.287*** 1.271*** 1.317*** 1.300*** 1.322*** 1.323*** 1.264***
(0.0539) (0.0541) (0.0559) (0.0462) (0.0516) (0.0428) (0.0552)
L2.gdp15 -0.340*** -0.334*** -0.354*** -0.361*** -0.370*** -0.367*** -0.337***
(0.0539) (0.0514) (0.0555) (0.0469) (0.0475) (0.0429) (0.0531)
Structural	reform 1.522*** 1.228*** 0.560* 1.010*** 0.734** 0.671** 1.845***
(0.3810) (0.4600) (0.3170) (0.3150) (0.3100) (0.3200) (0.4130)
EU	membership 0.520*** 0.817*** 0.701** 0.929*** 0.739*** 0.863*** 0.565***
(0.1640) (0.2060) (0.2920) (0.1970) (0.2260) (0.2440) (0.1290)
Constant 1.667*** 2.302*** 1.424*** 2.240*** 1.959*** 1.843*** 2.611***
(0.2720) (0.5160) (0.2420) (0.4360) (0.4660) (0.4450) (0.4040)
Observations 208 206 207 207 208 208 208
Number	of	country 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
ar1p 0.00149 0.00117 0.00163 0.00174 0.00213 0.00255 0.00131
ar1 -3.177 -3.246 -3.15 -3.132 -3.072 -3.017 -3.213
g_avg 13 12.88 12.94 12.94 13 13 13
chi2p 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
chi2 57425 53560 57776 63798 56306 34564 45281
h 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
df_m 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
N_g 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
g_max 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
g_min 13 11 12 12 13 13 13
artests 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
sigma 1.207 1.192 1.224 1.216 1.219 1.22 1.188
sig2 1.457 1.421 1.498 1.478 1.487 1.489 1.412
hansenp 0.48 0.402 0.52 0.352 0.315 0.386 0.485
hansen_df 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
hansen 12.59 13.61 12.1 14.32 14.87 13.83 12.53
sarganp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
sar_df 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
sargan 79.98 79.99 82.96 79.58 80.69 79.8 80.62
j0 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
j 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
ar2p 0.049 0.0488 0.0497 0.0422 0.0504 0.0553 0.0425
ar2 -1.968 -1.971 -1.963 -2.031 -1.957 -1.916 -2.028
NOTES:
Estimation :	System	Generalized	Method	of	Moments
One-step	estimation
Robust	standard	errors	in	paranthesis
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
Years :	1996-2016
Data :	World	governance	indicators	(World	Bank);	GDP	(IMF,	WEO).
Variables :	gdp15	-	country's	gdp	per	capita	as	a	share	of	gdp	p.c.	of	EU-15	average;	L.gdp15	and	L2.gdp15	-	first	and	second	lag	of	gdp15;	.	(EU-
15:	Austria;	Belgium;	Denmark;	France;	Finland;	Germany;	Greece;	Ireland;	Italy;	Luxembourg;	Netherlands;	Portugal;	Spain;	Sweden;	and	
United	Kindgom.)
World	governance	indicators:	min	(-2.5),	max	(2.5).
Countries :	Albania;	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina;	Bulgaria;	Croatia;	Czech	Republic;	Estonia;	Hungary;	Latvia;	Lithuania;	
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Table A2. 
Transition indicators and convergence 
 
 
  
Dynamic	Panel	Data	Regression
Dependent	variable:	Country's	GDP	p.c.	as	a	share	of	average	EU-15
Variables/Reform
Large	scale	
privatisation
Small	scale	
privatisation
Governance	
and	enterprise	
restructuring
Price	
liberalisation
Trade	and	
forex	system
Competition	
policy
Transition	
index
L.gdp15 1.375*** 1.388*** 1.367*** 1.395*** 1.397*** 1.393*** 1.375***
(0.0404) (0.0357) (0.0348) (0.0409) (0.0392) (0.0393) (0.0366)
L2.gdp15 -0.393*** -0.411*** -0.397*** -0.406*** -0.410*** -0.413*** -0.399***
(0.0409) (0.0356) (0.0357) (0.0409) (0.0385) (0.0388) (0.0378)
Structural	reform 0.463*** 0.518*** 0.663*** 0.371* 0.259** 0.361* 0.701***
(0.1390) (0.1600) (0.1700) (0.2060) (0.1270) (0.1960) (0.2300)
EU	membership 0.354*** 0.486*** 0.313*** 0.405*** 0.445*** 0.256* 0.337***
(0.1320) (0.1180) (0.1130) (0.1110) (0.1170) (0.1520) (0.1240)
Constant -0.473 -0.867** -0.279 -0.758 -0.196 0.258 -1.166**
(0.3330) (0.3900) (0.2360) (0.8420) (0.4340) (0.2630) (0.5870)
Observations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
Number	of	country 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
ar1p 0.00204 0.00205 0.00295 0.00204 0.00212 0.00196 0.00209
ar1 -3.085 -3.083 -2.973 -3.084 -3.073 -3.096 -3.078
g_avg 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25 16.25
chi2p 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
chi2 99167 164008 68937 113662 105784 104071 83615
h 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
df_m 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
N_g 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
g_max 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
g_min 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
artests 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
sigma 1.215 1.226 1.211 1.232 1.232 1.224 1.217
sig2 1.477 1.503 1.465 1.518 1.517 1.498 1.48
hansenp 0.88 0.816 0.837 0.842 0.899 0.935 0.888
hansen_df 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
hansen 10.52 11.74 11.37 11.28 10.11 9.169 10.36
sarganp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
sar_df 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
sargan 88.86 86.62 86.08 87.62 87.13 86.9 86.47
j0 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
j 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
ar2p 0.0779 0.0869 0.0709 0.0882 0.0875 0.0796 0.0798
ar2 -1.763 -1.712 -1.806 -1.705 -1.709 -1.753 -1.752
NOTES:
Estimation :	System	Generalized	Method	of	Moments
One-step	estimation
Robust	standard	errors	in	paranthesis
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
Years :	1996-2014
Data :	Transition	indicators	(EBRD);	GDP	(IMF,	WEO).
Transition	indicators:	min	(1),	max	(4+).
Countries :	Albania;	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina;	Bulgaria;	Croatia;	Czech	Republic;	Estonia;	Hungary;	Latvia;	Lithuania;	Macedonia;	
Variables :	gdp15	-	country's	gdp	per	capita	as	a	share	of	gdp	p.c.	of	EU-15	average;	L.gdp15	and	L2.gdp15	-	first	and	second	lag	
of	gdp15.		(EU-15:	Austria;	Belgium;	Denmark;	France;	Finland;	Germany;	Greece;	Ireland;	Italy;	Luxembourg;	Netherlands;	
Portugal;	Spain;	Sweden;	and	United	Kindgom.)
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Table A3. 
Global competitiveness index and convergence 
 
 
  
Dynamic	Panel	Data	Regression
Dependent	variable:	Country's	GDP	p.c.	as	a	share	of	average	EU-15
Variables/Reform Institutions Infrastucture
Macroeconomic	
environment
Health	and	
primary	
Higher	
education	and	
Goods	market	
efficiency
Labour	market	
efficiency
L.gdp15 1.316*** 1.328*** 1.327*** 1.327*** 1.323*** 1.305*** 1.299***
(0.0393) (0.0390) (0.0425) (0.0395) (0.0409) (0.0326) (0.0359)
L2.gdp15 -0.564*** -0.572*** -0.571*** -0.575*** -0.569*** -0.553*** -0.550***
(0.0726) (0.0752) (0.0753) (0.0750) (0.0741) (0.0684) (0.0692)
L3.gdp15 0.224*** 0.232*** 0.231*** 0.230*** 0.226*** 0.218*** 0.210***
(0.0567) (0.0560) (0.0552) (0.0561) (0.0550) (0.0541) (0.0534)
L4.gdp15 -0.000739 -0.00456 -0.00465 -0.0064 -0.00546 0.00563 0.0229
(0.0646) (0.0668) (0.0674) (0.0679) (0.0687) (0.0664) (0.0560)
Structural	reforms 0.474*** -0.0454 0.0325 0.436** 0.325 0.472** 0.901***
(0.1300) (0.4070) (0.1770) (0.2220) (0.2710) (0.1910) (0.1780)
EU	membership 1.098*** 1.007*** 0.994*** 1.088*** 1.009*** 1.028*** 0.797***
(0.2820) (0.3840) (0.3250) (0.3400) (0.2990) (0.3160) (0.2520)
Constant -0.719 0.925 0.665 -1.583 -0.388 -0.938 -2.835***
(0.4890) (1.0330) (0.7300) (1.1460) (0.9910) (0.7190) (0.7640)
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
Number	of	country 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
ar1p 0.00118 0.00113 0.00122 0.00116 0.00122 0.00113 0.000966
ar1 -3.243 -3.257 -3.234 -3.248 -3.234 -3.255 -3.3
g_avg 7.875 7.875 7.875 7.875 7.875 7.875 7.875
chi2p 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
chi2 43938 63739 90672 54020 53195 70436 53846
h 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
df_m 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
N_g 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
g_max 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
g_min 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
artests 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
sigma 0.723 0.729 0.729 0.727 0.729 0.719 0.713
sig2 0.522 0.531 0.531 0.528 0.532 0.517 0.508
hansenp 0.259 0.304 0.344 0.263 0.297 0.295 0.306
hansen_df 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
hansen 12.4 11.72 11.17 12.33 11.83 11.85 11.69
sarganp 1.20E-05 2.43E-06 2.65E-06 3.08E-06 3.29E-06 2.90E-06 7.25E-05
sar_df 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
sargan 40.85 44.73 44.52 44.16 44 44.3 36.38
j0 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
j 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
ar2p 0.103 0.0848 0.0773 0.0885 0.102 0.11 0.0654
ar2 1.629 1.724 1.767 1.703 1.636 1.599 1.842
NOTES:
Estimation :	System	Generalized	Method	of	Moments
One-step	estimation
Robust	standard	errors	in	paranthesis
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
Years :	2006-2017
Data :	Global	Competitiveness	Index	(WEO);	GDP	(IMF,	WEO).
Variables :	gdp15	-	country's	gdp	per	capita	as	a	share	of	gdp	p.c.	of	EU-15	average;	L.gdp15,	L2.gdp15	L3.gdp15	
and	L4.gdp15	-	first,	second,	third	and	fourth	lag	of	gdp15.	(EU-15:	Austria;	Belgium;	Denmark;	France;	Finland;	
Germany;	Greece;	Ireland;	Italy;	Luxembourg;	Netherlands;	Portugal;	Spain;	Sweden;	and	United	Kindgom.)
Global	competitiveness	index:	min	(1),	max	(7).
Countries :	Albania;	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina;	Bulgaria;	Croatia;	Czech	Republic;	Estonia;	Hungary;	Latvia;	
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Table A3. 
Global competitiveness index and convergence (continued) 
	
Dynamic	Panel	Data	Regression
Dependent	variable:	Country's	GDP	p.c.	as	a	share	of	average	EU-15
Variables/Reform
Financial	maerket	
development
Technology	
readiness
Market	size
Business	
sophistication
Innovation
Global	
competitiveness	
index
L.gdp15 1.286*** 1.328*** 1.337*** 1.286*** 1.325*** 1.294***
(0.0435) (0.0379) (0.0389) (0.0399) (0.0392) (0.0355)
L2.gdp15 -0.545*** -0.571*** -0.576*** -0.555*** -0.573*** -0.545***
(0.0761) (0.0754) (0.0737) (0.0708) (0.0739) (0.0671)
L3.gdp15 0.208*** 0.231*** 0.232*** 0.219*** 0.237*** 0.213***
(0.0627) (0.0523) (0.0552) (0.0574) (0.0562) (0.0522)
L4.gdp15 0.0283 -0.00603 -0.011 0.00829 -0.0146 0.00923
(0.0647) (0.0672) (0.0662) (0.0660) (0.0669) (0.0642)
Structural	reforms 0.532*** 0.0261 -0.143 1.102** 0.342 1.129**
(0.1500) (0.1780) (0.1190) (0.4420) (0.3270) (0.4900)
EU	membership 0.980*** 0.999*** 1.140*** 1.100*** 1.069*** 0.878***
(0.2800) (0.3080) (0.3630) (0.3360) (0.3180) (0.2990)
Constant -1.040* 0.71 1.215** -2.383* 0.00113 -3.408**
(0.5450) (0.5930) (0.4810) (1.2740) (0.7890) (1.7290)
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126
Number	of	country 16 16 16 16 16 16
ar1p 0.0011 0.00125 0.00127 0.00111 0.00112 0.00096
ar1 -3.262 -3.228 -3.223 -3.262 -3.259 -3.302
g_avg 7.875 7.875 7.875 7.875 7.875 7.875
chi2p 0 0 0 0 0 0
chi2 186223 75352 94104 39111 55559 63003
h 3 3 3 3 3 3
df_m 6 6 6 6 6 6
N_g 16 16 16 16 16 16
g_max 8 8 8 8 8 8
g_min 7 7 7 7 7 7
artests 2 2 2 2 2 2
sigma 0.709 0.729 0.732 0.712 0.729 0.713
sig2 0.503 0.532 0.535 0.507 0.531 0.509
hansenp 0.361 0.281 0.3 0.358 0.302 0.257
hansen_df 10 10 10 10 10 10
hansen 10.95 12.07 11.78 11 11.76 12.44
sarganp 1.31E-05 2.00E-06 5.35E-06 1.28E-05 2.03E-06 4.72E-06
sar_df 10 10 10 10 10 10
sargan 40.62 45.21 42.82 40.69 45.17 43.13
j0 18 18 18 18 18 18
j 17 17 17 17 17 17
ar2p 0.117 0.0888 0.0843 0.107 0.0984 0.12
ar2 1.566 1.702 1.727 1.61 1.653 1.556
NOTES:
Estimation :	System	Generalized	Method	of	Moments
One-step	estimation
Robust	standard	errors	in	paranthesis
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
Global	competitiveness	index:	min	(1),	max	(7).
Countries :	Albania;	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina;	Bulgaria;	Croatia;	Czech	Republic;	Estonia;	Hungary;	Latvia;	Lithuania;	Macedonia;	Monetenegro;	Poland;	Romania;	Serbia;	Slovak	Republic;	and	Slovenia.
Years :	2006-2017
Data :	Global	Competitiveness	Index	(WEO);	GDP	(IMF,	WEO).
Variables :	gdp15	-	country's	gdp	per	capita	as	a	share	of	gdp	p.c.	of	EU-15	average;	L.gdp15,	L2.gdp15	L3.gdp15	and	L4.gdp15	-	
first,	second,	third	and	fourth	lag	of	gdp15.	(EU-15:	Austria;	Belgium;	Denmark;	France;	Finland;	Germany;	Greece;	Ireland;	Italy;	
Luxembourg;	Netherlands;	Portugal;	Spain;	Sweden;	and	United	Kindgom.)
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